Supreme Court confirmation is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but lower court confirmation is less well understood, in part because lower court nominees are very rarely rejected, and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, the length of time it takes to fill a judicial vacancy serves as alternate evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate. We present an empirical assessment of appellate vacancy conflict, based on a continuous time-proportional hazard model of vacancy duration. Our results demonstrate that female and minority candidates are confirmed only after unusually long vacancies, and this has nothing to do with the qualifications of the nominees. Our results also demonstrate that institutional and partisan conflict between the Senate and the White House drive the confirmation process for the federal appeals courts, but delay tactics employed by the Senate are only partially strategic.
vacancy durations. Researchers have addressed some of these propositions, but others remain unexplored.
Studies of appeals court confirmation are limited, but there is a wealth of qualitative and quantitative literature on Supreme Court confirmation politics. Although the focus of their argument was on minority constituency effects in the Clarence Thomas case, Overby, Henschen, Strauss, and Walsh (1992) clearly demonstrated that the confirmation votes of individual senators were primarily determined by partisanship. Partisanship and ideology have been shown to be the dominant factors in confirmation votes cast by senators for the entire collection of Supreme Court nominees (Cameron, Cover, & Segal, 1990; Segal, Cameron, & Cover, 1992) . Gimpel and Wolpert (1995) examined public opinion on Supreme Court nominations, finding that "the public joins elites in evaluating nominees on partisan grounds rather than a politically-neutral assessment of legal qualifications and experience" (p. 67). They developed a model to show that a citizen's attitude toward Bush and Reagan nominees was influenced by race, gender, partisanship, political awareness, and duration of the nomination process. They concluded, in part, that an extended confirmation process is generally not to the nominee's advantage. The Gimpel and Wolpert findings validate a suggestion made by Grossman and Wasby (1972) -that appointment delay is sometimes an explicit strategy opponents use to fight a nomination.
Building on this finding, some preliminary research suggests that delay of the confirmation vote is explicitly pursued by the president's opponents in the Senate (Cameron & Segal, 1998) . In a recent paper, Cameron and Segal (1998) examined Supreme Court confirmation duration with regard to the politics surrounding scandals. They measured the duration of confirmation, presence of scandal, and roll call margins for all Supreme Court nominations from 1877 to 1994. Regardless of the basis for opposition to a president's nominee, the principal tactic of opponents was to delay and search for possible scandals in the nominee's background. The authors demonstrate that the degree to which the Senate delays the confirmation process, as indicated by the length of time a nominee remains unconfirmed, is significantly related to the size of the president's opposition in the Senate.
Turning to the lower courts, Allison (1996) examined a particular component of confirmation delay: the time the Senate Judiciary Com-mittee takes to evaluate a nominee before referring him or her to the Senate chamber. He found that the presidential election cycle and American Bar Association (ABA) ratings are important determinants of how quickly the Senate Judiciary Committee moves on a lower court nominee. He also claimed that "when other variables . . . are factored into an aggregate model, Senate majority [control] has no discernable effect on the length of confirmation" (pp. 11-12) but presented no aggregate or multivariate model of delay. Hartley and Holmes (1997) also specifically examined the time it takes the Senate Judiciary Committee to refer a lower court nominee to the Senate and found that delay is largely insensitive to divided government. Like the Allison findings, the Hartley and Holmes evidence is limited to Senate Judiciary Committee delay and is based on differences of mean durations, with no multivariate controls.
The previous research on lower court appointment delay is an instructive start but is limited in four important respects. First, a number of interesting hypotheses have not been examined. For example, a substantial literature attests to the importance of race and gender in federal court appointment politics (Goldman, 1995; Goldman & Saronson, 1994; Goldman & Slotnick, 1997; Slotnick, 1983 Slotnick, , 1984 . The confirmation delay literature has not examined these factors. Second, one of the most difficult problems in the study of appointments has been consistently ignored: Does the delay itself result in the weakening of a candidate, or is the delay a result of a nominee's inherent weaknesses? This study begins to untangle that question with respect to race and gender. Third, the previous research on appeals courts confirmation delay has been largely descriptive in nature and has presented only limited controls for confounding factors. For example, vacancy duration increased dramatically during the last years of the Carter administration. What portion of that increase is attributable to the unprecedented diversity of Carter's nominees, and what portion is attributable to the impending 1980 election or the results of the 1978 midterm election? Only a multivariate model can begin to disentangle these effects and identify the independent contributions of these factors.
1 Fourth and finally, the published research on appeals courts confirmation delay has examined only a limited component of delay-the degree of scrutiny by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Although this is a very important stage in the process, it tells only part of the story.
Larger constitutional issues are at stake: the ability of the president and Senate to negotiate a compromise to maintain adequate federal court staffing and the likely character of the federal bench that results from such negotiation. A more encompassing view of those negotiations is necessary, and this requires a look at the broader measure of how long it takes to fill a vacancy on the federal bench.
DATA AND STATISTICAL METHODS
A number of intermediate dates could be used in examining the length of time it takes to fill a vacant judgeship. For example, we could examine two separate durations-the time from the beginning of a vacancy until the president names a nominee and the time from nomination to confirmation. Cameron and Segal (1998) have begun their analysis of Supreme Court vacancies using this convention, with nominees serving as the unit of analysis.
For the lower federal courts, designs based on nominations make delineation of the universe of observations difficult and perhaps impossible. Nominees are occasionally rejected or withdrawn, and a single judicial vacancy may involve several iterations of the nomination/confirmation process, all of which are difficult to document and many of which are informal. For example, Senator Case (R-NJ) had been pushing for an appeals court appointment for Clarence Ferguson for almost 2 years prior to a vacancy opening up on the 3rd Circuit in 1971. However, Case withdrew his support at an indeterminate point in the middle of the process, and James Rosen was eventually the official nominee and was confirmed (Madden, 1971) . That is, Ferguson was never even nominated, even though his "candidacy" probably ought to be examined if nominees are the units of analysis. Stephanie Seymour was selected by Carter for nomination to the 10th Circuit out of a field of four candidates (Goldman, 1997, p. 249) after some delay. Reagan and then-Governor Treen, of Louisiana, discussed Benjamin Toledano as a possible appointee to the 5th Circuit (Goldman, 1997, p. 295) , but he was never nominated, and Reagan eventually nominated Eugene Davis. Goldman's (1997) account of lower court appointments includes many references to "trial nominees" discussed during informal negotiations. In addition, nominations to replace chief judges are frequently forwarded before the seat is technically vacant, leading to negative measures of time. Identification of the date the president becomes aware of a vacancy would solve this problem, but that information is impossible to reliably obtain.
Based on the aforementioned theoretical and practical limitations, the total amount of time a vacancy persists is the best and most encompassing measure of presidential-Senate appointment negotiation difficulties.
2 This measure of delay is a very broad indicator of presidentialSenate negotiations, 3 rather than the more specific indicators of Senate Judiciary Committee scrutiny that have been used in the past (Allison, 1996; Hartley & Holmes, 1997) . Vacancies, in this design, are our units of analysis, rather than nominees.
For both theoretical and practical reasons, we consider vacancies arising due to the departure of a sitting judge separately from vacancies arising due to the statutory creation of a new seat. From a theoretical and empirical standpoint, it is clear that new seat and replacement appointments are driven by both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct factors (Barrow, Gryski, & Zuk, 1996) . From a practical standpoint, we hypothesize a number of personal characteristics of judges and their predecessors that affect vacancy duration. These effects cannot be examined for those observations in which the appointment was for a new seat on the bench. To take the most obvious example, vacancies arising from the death of a sitting judge are more often unanticipated and take longer to fill. For new seat appointments, death of the predecessor is obviously not a relevant consideration and would introduce missing data, excluding those observations from the analysis.
We employ Cox's proportional hazard model, a semiparametric model typically used to study mortality factors. In our context, the analogy to mortality is the filling of a vacancy. The key dependent variable for the proportional hazard model is the hazard rate, which translates in our context to the probability that a seat will be filled at a given point. A higher hazard rate results in a shorter duration, so the coefficients in our estimation results are inversely related to duration. Cox's model provides a significant advantage over the family of parametric log-linear models in that it makes limited distributional assumptions, whereas the log-linear models make distributional assumptions that often have consequences for inferences (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997; Cox & Oakes, 1984) . 4 For these reasons and others, Cam-eron and Segal (1998) also relied on the Cox proportional hazard model in their examination of Supreme Court confirmation delay. Once a circuit seat becomes vacant, either because it has been created by legislation or because the occupant has left office, the time taken to fill the slot (in days) defines the vacancy duration. In our formulation, the time taken to fill a seat is a function of some plausible explanatory factors, ranging from innocuous controls to strategic interaction between the Senate and the president. A proportional hazard model allows a suitable regression to examine the effects of our hypothesized factors.
We designed the data set as follows: We collected one observation for each federal appellate court vacancy that arose between April 1892 and December 1994. 5 For each observation, the date the seat became vacant, either due to retirement or death of predecessor (n = 395) or due to creation of a new judgeship (n = 153), was recorded. 6 The number of days from the beginning of the vacancy until the seat was filled by the president signing the commission 7 serves as our dependent variable. 8 Various characteristics of the eventual appointees, their predecessors, and the political context that obtained at the beginning of the vacancy were recorded as potential independent variables. Virtually all of the appointee characteristics were derived from Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski's (1997) appellate biographical database. 9 The Federal Judicial Center graciously provided the authoritative dates of service for each judge and the dates of passage for the 34 Judgeship Acts. Table 1 presents a historical description of vacancy durations for replacements and new seats, respectively. For replacement appointments, vacancy duration has been climbing fairly steadily since 1972. Average duration almost tripled between 1972 and 1994, from 125 days to 360. This dramatic increase is sensible in light of the modern Senate's more activist view of its confirmation role. Table 1 also illustrates the significant lengthening of vacancy duration for replacements beginning with Eisenhower's appointees. The ABA first became an institutionalized player in the appointment process during Eisenhower's administration. ABA ratings provide another institutional hurdle in the appointment process and probably serve as another tool for opponents of nominees seeking to delay their confirmation.
For new judgeships, the average vacancy duration has climbed fairly steadily during the post-World War II era. The 1949 judgeships were vacant less than 3 months, on average, but three of the six judgeships were to the D.C. Circuit, and five of the six judgeships were filled by a recess commission. By contrast, the 1991 judgeships took an average of 2.4 years to fill.
New seats have been neither consistently prioritized nor consistently ignored, relative to replacement vacancies. For example, the 1961 Judgeship Act vacancies were filled more quickly than contemporaneous replacement vacancies, and vacancies established by the 1968, 1978, and 1991 Judgeship Acts dragged on unusually long, relative to contemporaneous replacement vacancies. What remains to be seen is whether and to what extent political factors help explain variation in vacancy duration, either for new or for replacement vacancies. To answer these questions, we turn to the empirical model. 
MODEL OF VACANCY DURATION
A number of political and nonpolitical factors may affect the time it takes for the Senate and president to cooperate sufficiently to fill a vacant judgeship. On the political front, the president seems less inclined to nominate replacements, and the Senate seems less inclined to confirm them as the presidential administration wears on. This dynamic was empirically confirmed at the state level (Nase, 1997) . At the federal level, Segal (1987) has shown that presidents do not alter their nominating strategy for Supreme Court appointments over the course of their administration. However, the Senate seems to alter its reaction, rejecting a much higher proportion of nominees during a presidential election year. The president presumably has less incentive to compromise under those conditions, and the president's opponents have increased hopes of a change in White House control. On those occasions when White House control has changed, the president's Senate opponents have reaped the rewards of dramatically different appointees. Four district and circuit nominations expired at the end of the Johnson presidency and were filled by Nixon. Ten lower court nominations expired at the end of the Ford presidency and were filled by Carter. The numbers for Carter and Bush are 16 and 99, respectively. We included a linear indicator of the time in years since the most recent presidential election. Those vacancies arising later in a presidential administration are hypothesized to remain vacant longer. 10 An interaction term with a dummy measure for second presidential administrations allows for the possibility that this effect is significantly different during a president's last administration.
11 Related research on federal bench retirements indicates that vacancies arising during second presidential terms are significantly harder to fill quickly (Hagle, 1993; Spriggs & Wahlbeck, 1994) .
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Of course, senators of the party opposite the president's always have an ability to delay the confirmation process. Holds and other prerogatives based on the filibuster are increasingly used by U.S. senators (Binder & Smith, 1997) but are not necessarily observable. As the strength of the opposition party in the Senate grows, the ability to delay presumably grows. This relationship may not be perfectly linear, of course. Either of two critical thresholds for the president's party-majority control of the chamber and a filibuster-proof majority-may result in substantial reductions in vacancy duration, as the institutional mechanisms for delay in the Senate pass to the president's party. For example, control of the chamber proved hugely important in the contentious Manion battle in 1986, which almost certainly would have failed through procedural delay if the Senate had been controlled by the Democrats. Similarly, Kennedy's lower court appointments met much less resistance after his party garnered a filibuster-proof majority in the 1962 election. We propose two dummy measures of institutional delay opportunity for the president's opponents. Under conditions of unified government or a filibuster-proof majority for the president's party, vacancies are predicted to be significantly shorter in duration.
13 Previous descriptions have suggested that divided government does not result in delay of referral by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Allison, 1996; Hartley & Holmes, 1997) .
Strict institutional measures of Senate opposition, although important and theoretically interesting in their own right, cannot reflect variation in intensity of opposition by individual senators. For this reason, we investigate delay incentives in a more nuanced manner. We hypothesize that when the president's opposition party occupies a larger portion of seats on the appellate bench, 14 the president's opposition party in the Senate will engage in more intense delay tactics. The logic of this proposition is quite simple: When "your guys" are making all the decisions, you have an incentive to prolong that situation. We established an interactive term between size of the president's opposition in the Senate and size of the president's opposition on the bench as a summary measure of the opportunity and incentive to delay. 15 Finally, Goldman, Slotnick, and others have described significantly different approaches by recent presidents on the issue of appointing minorities and women to the federal bench (Goldman, 1995; Goldman & Saronson, 1994; Goldman & Slotnick, 1997; Slotnick, 1983 Slotnick, , 1984 . Thurgood Marshall's appointment to a new seat on the 4th Circuit is perhaps the most famous example of delay rooted in a racist senator's opposition. But the Reagan administration suggested a very different possible cause of delay when it expressed frustration with its efforts to identify qualified conservative minority candidates due to a small pool of Republican minorities (Goldman, 1997, p. 335) . Either because there is a smaller pool of qualified potential nominees or because there is more opposition to appointment of such judges, we hypothesize that when the president and Senate eventually agree on female or minority appointees, the process takes longer. 16 To ensure that the estimates for the aforementioned political factors are not contaminated by important noncontroversial or idiosyncratic factors, we included a number of control variables. For example, we included a linear trend over time to capture the increasing scrutiny that all manner of political actors employ during the appointment process. Deering (1987) notes a number of process factors leading to steadily increasing vacancy durations for all presidential appointees. When a seat is filled by elevating a federal district judge, the vacancy duration should have been briefer. Elevation is one of the first strategies considered by the president's team, in part because the confirmation battle has already been waged and won for that individual. We included a dummy measure for vacancies filled by elevation to control for this phenomenon.
Unanticipated vacancies probably take longer to fill, of course. The vacancy created by Charles Robb's retirement from the D.C. Circuit took only 30 days to fill in 1937, but only because Robb had transmitted a formal letter of retirement to FDR earlier (Goldman, 1997, p. 27) . Unfortunately, the existence and dates of such preannouncements have not been reliably documented, and the political aspects of such preannouncements have not been studied. As a result, vacancies arising from deaths are the only ones we can reliably identify as unanticipated. However, we also included a measure of whether the vacancy was filled by a recess appointment. If presidents use recess appointments to short-circuit the normal confirmation process, then vacancy duration should be negatively associated with recess appointments. On the other hand, a positive relationship between vacancy duration and recess appointment probably indicates that recess commissions are employed by presidents only after the normal confirmation process has proved intractable.
Because the District of Columbia has no formal representation in Congress, senatorial courtesy is practically a nonissue for D.C. Circuit appointments. Senators from the home states of D.C. nominees occasionally play a part in the process, as was the case for Spottswood Robinson (Goldman, 1997, p. 184) , but for the most part, negotiations over D.C. Circuit appointments are substantially smoothed by the absence of "turf" issues. It seems clear that D.C. Circuit judgeships receive priority attention from the president and the Senate, with a typical vacancy lasting only about 70% as long as the rest of the federal circuits. We included a dummy indicator for the D.C. Circuit to account for this distinctiveness in vacancy duration.
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Pressures to fill vacancies may come from the bench itself or from its clients. The increased workload resulting from numerous vacancies interferes with the effectiveness of the judicial branch. Presumably, politicians are cognizant of these practical considerations, and this is one of the primary nonpolitical reasons that new judgeships are created in the first place. We included a measure of the proportional change in per judge case filings between the time the vacancy began and the previous year as our measure of the workload factor. 18 We predict the coefficient to be positive, as a growing workload leads politicians to foreshorten the appointment process (read: increase the hazard of filling the position) to meet the practical demands of the judiciary.
At some point, the sheer magnitude of vacancies may become an impediment to filling vacant seats, as it appears to be in recent years. On the other hand, it is equally plausible, a priori, that economies of scale prevail in filling vacant seats. For example, in dispensing with the unprecedented number of judicial vacancies, President Carter preferred to transmit whole lists of nominees to the Senate rather than submitting them one at a time. For each observation, we included a measure of the total number of additional appeals court seats vacant at the time. If the coefficient is negative, it indicates a negative contagion in the appointment process, wherein an increasing backlog of vacancies actually increases the time until each individual vacancy is filled. On the other hand, if the coefficient is positive, it indicates that economies of scale prevail in the filling of vacancies.
In summary, we separately examined all the replacement vacancies (n = 395) and new seat vacancies (n = 153) on the circuit courts of appeals between 1892 and 1994. Vacancy duration was modeled as a function of the following:
• years passed since most recent presidential election (ranging from 0.019 to 3.995);
• interaction between years since most recent presidential election and second presidential term dummy indicator; • filibuster-proof majority for president's party in the Senate at time vacancy began (0 = no, 1 = yes); • unified government at time vacancy began (0 = no, 1 = yes);
• interaction between size of president's opposition in Senate (ranging from .174 to .650) and on appellate bench (ranging from .172 to .831), respectively; • gender of confirmed appointee (0 = male, 1 = female);
• race of confirmed appointee (0 = White; 1 = Black, Hispanic, or Asian);
• date the vacancy began (ranging from 1893.105 to 1994.832);
• vacancy filled by elevation of a federal district court judge (0 = no, 1 = yes); • death creating the vacancy (0 = no, 1 = yes);
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• recess appointment dummy indicator;
• D.C. Circuit dummy indicator;
• proportional annual growth in per judge workload at time vacancy began (ranging from -.168 to .281); • total vacant appellate seats at time vacancy began (ranging from 0 to 38).
In addition to this list, we subsequently considered an additional variable that cannot be examined for the full sample of vacancies-ABA ratings of the eventual appointee. 20 The earlier discussion pointed out that there is substantial and very important disagreement about the reasons minorities and women are seldom appointed to the federal bench. Slotnick (1983) demonstrated that women and minority candidates were likely to have poorer ABA ratings because of career track differences with White male counterparts. This reasoning echoes the "shallow pool of candidates" concerns of the Reagan administration. Inclusion of ABA ratings in our analysis presents an opportunity to answer, at least partially, a heretofore ignored question: Is the delay of a candidate rooted in his or her own foibles? Grossman and Wasby (1972) , looking at the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court rejections, asserted that appointment conflicts are ultimately rooted in the shortcomings of the candidate. If ABA ratings are included in the model and the demographic factors remain significant determinants of delay, then something other than qualification factors are operating in these cases. On the other hand, if ABA ratings are included, and the demographic factors lose significance, we may infer that qualification and ABA rating issues are largely to blame for vacancy delay for women and minorities. Because ABA ratings are available only since 1947, inclusion of this factor restricts the sample to the 271 most recent replacements and the 108 most recent new seats. Thus, inclusion of this variable will help uncover the roots of gender and race delay, if they exist, and will help shed light on issues of time boundedness of our results.
RESULTS
We subset our analyses between new seat vacancies and replacement vacancies to examine some additional factors for replacements and to estimate different effects of the independent variables in the two separate contexts. We further subdivided our examination into three distinct regression specifications to demonstrate that our findings are not rooted in the peculiarities of specific variables or the collinearities among them.
21 Table 2 presents three different regression specifications for each of the two types of vacancies.
As previously noted, the proportional hazard model features the hazard rate as its dependent variable, so a negative coefficient indicates a positive relationship between an independent variable and vacancy duration. For example, the coefficient for the year the vacancy began is negative and significant, indicating that for all types of appointments, vacancy duration has grown significantly longer over time. Each year has seen about a 2.5% decrease in the hazard rate. Although a minor effect from one year to the next, this steady increase has resulted in a lengthening of predicted durations by about 700% since 1900.
For new seats, only two interesting variables are significantly related to vacancy duration. The model estimates indicate that vacancies are significantly shorter when filled through a recess commission and when the Senate has increased incentive and opportunity to delay. There is some indication that new seat vacancy durations are significantly longer under divided government, but the finding is very sensitive to specification. The recess finding for new seats is largely driven by Truman's five recess appointments in 1949, which he used to bypass his opponents in the Senate. 22 The fact that new seat appointments are filled significantly more quickly when the Senate has greater incentive and opportunity to delay is a puzzling finding, which is supported in the analysis of replacement appointments as well. This issue will be addressed shortly.
For replacement seats, vacancy duration is significantly and positively related to the trend over time, the dummy indicator of predecessor death, years since the last presidential election, and the dummy indicators for women and minorities. Vacancy duration for replacement seats is significantly shorter for the D.C. Circuit, at times of increased workload on the bench, when the vacancy is filled by elevating a district judge, under filibuster-proof majorities in the Senate, and when the Senate has increased incentive and/or opportunity to delay.
Dummy indicators are relatively simple to interpret in the Cox model. For a coefficient, b, the hazard rate for indicated observations is (e b )% of the hazard rate for nonindicated observations. Therefore, when death leads to a vacancy, Model 1 estimates indicate that the hazard rate of filling the seat is 70% of the rate for anticipated vacancies (e -.351 = .70). The much smaller hazard results in a much longer duration. Using the same logic and relying on Model 1 estimates, the hazard rate for D.C. Circuit vacancies is 183% of the rate for other circuit vacancies (e .606 = 1.83), and the hazard rates for women and minorities are 63% and 54% as large as for men and Whites, respectively. This effect-that at any given moment, the likelihood of confirming a minority 23 is only about half as large as the likelihood of confirming a White nominee-can be illustrated more concretely through KaplanMeier survival curves, shown in Figure 1 .
The predicted survival curves, evaluated at the means for all other independent variables and at two values for race (0 and 1), illustrate the dramatic impact this factor has on vacancy duration. Figure 1 illustrates that replacements who are minorities are much less likely to be confirmed, relative to Whites at similar stages. The reduced hazard of confirmation results in vacancies that are, on average, about twice as long in duration for minority appointees. A similar demonstration would illustrate the gender effect, which is almost as strong as the minority effect. These findings support the suggestions by Goldman, Slotnick, and others that gender and race are salient and contentious aspects of judicial nominations (Goldman, 1995; Goldman & Saronson, 1994; Goldman & Slotnick, 1997; Slotnick, 1983 Slotnick, , 1984 . Carter's 6th Circuit appointment of Nathaniel Jones and Johnson's D.C. elevation of Spottswood Robinson, both African Americans, illustrate some of the larger dynamics. Due to internal administration jockeying, the vacancy Jones filled lasted 460 days. Attorney General Bell 24 had been pushing for Thomas Lambros-a White candidatefor the position. Bell's efforts failed, but he was able to delay the Jones nomination for about 10 months, in Goldman's (1997) assessment. The next appellate vacancy was filled by Phyllis Kravitch, a White female. Her candidacy was also opposed by Bell, who preferred Albert Henderson, another White male, and Bell's opposition delayed her nomination about 3 months, according to Goldman. Spottswood Robinson was elevated to a D.C. Circuit vacancy in 1966. The vacancy he filled had persisted for 386 days, and there is strong indication that race was a significant factor in the delay of his district court appointment (Goldman, 1997, p. 184) . By contrast, the previous D.C. vacancy was filled by Edward Tamm, a White male, in only 1 day in 1965. As a further exploration for some of these findings, we included ABA ratings of the eventual appointee for a more recent subset of the data. Table 3 presents an additional model of vacancy duration for replacements.
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Model 4 includes ABA ratings for the appointee who filled the vacancy to parse some of the bases for delay of women and minority appointments. ABA ratings, by themselves, are not a significant factor in appointment delay. When a vacancy was filled by a "well-qualified" judge, the hazard rate for filling the position had been only 9% greater than if it had been filled by a merely "qualified" judge. Both the gender and minority effects remain significant, and the gender effect appears even stronger after controlling for ABA rankings. Women and minorities take longer to confirm, and this is the first empirical indication of which we are aware that the delay is not rooted in poorer ABA ratings for such nominees. 26 If anything, ignoring ABA ratings understates how much longer it takes to fill a seat with a woman. As for the political aspects, Figure 2 illustrates the effect that a filibuster-proof majority has on vacancy duration, based on Model 1 estimates. The hazard rate for such a circumstance is 161% of the rate for "normal" partisan level in the Senate. The Kaplan-Meier curves in Figure 2 illustrate that a filibuster-proof majority for the president's party results in dramatically shorter vacancy durations-less than half as long. To illustrate, vacancies arising during the first 2 years of the Kennedy administration persisted for 395 days, on average. Democrats captured a filibuster-proof majority in the 1962 election, and vacancies persisted only 256 days, on average, during the next congressional session.
At the same time that vacancies are predicted to have shortened during 1962 to 1963, another factor was actually lengthening those vacancies: the looming 1964 presidential election. The hazard rate for a vacancy arising in June of a president's first reelection year is e 3*-.119 = .70, or 30% smaller than the hazard rate for a vacancy arising 3 years earlier. Thus, the ability of the president and the Senate to negotiate an acceptable compromise declines as a presidential election looms.
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Figure 2: Survival Curves by Size of Senate Majority
However, the interaction term for second administrations largely cancels out this effect after a president has been reelected. During a second administration, a vacancy arising during June of the election year is about 90% as large as it was 3 years earlier (e 3*(-.119 + .086) = .91). Contrary to expectations, then, vacancies appear to lengthen as a president's first administration progresses but much less so as his required departure from the White House approaches.
As for Senate incentive and opportunity to delay, the results are strikingly counterintuitive and difficult to refute. There is very substantial collinearity between Senate and bench partisanship, so Models 2 and 3 present alternative specifications. Overall, variation in the Senate's incentive and opportunity to delay is negatively related to vacancy duration, regardless of the exact specification adopted. In either Model 1 or 2, the effect of unified government on the hazard rate is negative, which implies that vacancies are shorter under divided government. In either Model 1 or 3, the effect of the interaction term on the hazard rate is positive, which implies that vacancies are shorter when the Senate has greater incentive or opportunity to delay. Collinearity obscures the significance for divided government in Model 1, 27 but otherwise the effects are consistently and strongly contrary to expectations. An examination of the log-likelihoods indicates that dropping the incentive variable is more consequential, so if one were to adopt only a solitary measure of Senate incentives and opportunities to delay, the interactive term would be superior on statistical grounds, 28 and thus Model 3 is preferable. Figure 3 presents the survival curves for two extreme scenarios, based on Model 3 estimates-one in which the president's Senate and bench opposition are at the maximum observed in our data (high incentive/opportunity to delay) and one in which the president's Senate and bench opposition are at the minimum observed (low incentive/ opportunity to delay). As previously mentioned, when the Senate has high incentive and opportunity to delay, vacancies are significantly shorter, not longer.
This finding is especially surprising, given that previous research on Supreme Court appointments found a positive relationship between vacancy duration and size of the president's opposition in the Senate (Cameron & Segal, 1998) , and previous research on appeals court appointments found no relationship between Senate Judiciary Committee delay and divided government (Allison, 1996; Hartley & Holmes, 1997) . Recognizing the caveat that these studies are not strictly comparable with our own, our results lead us to conclude that partisan conflict over lower court vacancies is qualitatively distinct from conflict over Supreme Court appointments, in this respect, and the overall pattern of vacancy delay is not reflected in the specific pattern of Senate Judiciary Committee delay described in previous research. Overall, the pattern of vacancy delay for the federal courts of appeals appears to run contrary to a short-term rational model of Senate-president negotiations.
There are two possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding. First, journalistic and academic accounts of presidential-congressional relations routinely refer to a brief "honeymoon" of temporary support immediately after the president is elected, regardless of the partisan control of Congress. Our results, indicating an increase in predicted vacancy duration as an administration wears on, buttress this explanation. Second, recent studies of presidential nominations in general have contradicted intuitive notions and shown that there are no significant effects of divided government. Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond (1998) concluded that the Senate rules provide that partisan opponents of a president "can challenge nominations about as effectively under unified as under divided control" (p. 878).
To explain this puzzle, it is useful to reconsider precisely when the Senate has greatest opportunity and incentive to delay. Figure 4 illustrates the interactive term over the span of our data. Combined Senate and bench opposition is clearly greatest immediately following a change in partisan control of the White House. This is so not only because the bench is dominated by appointments from previous administrations but also because partisan change of the Senate tends to be delayed by their extended terms of service.
For example, Eisenhower's party gained control of the Senate in 1953 (Democrats constituted 49.5%), but more than 80% of the appellate judges were Democrats at the time. By the end of 1958, Republicans had lost the Senate by a slim margin, but the Democratic share of the appellate bench had been reduced dramatically. Only 53.1% of appellate judges were Democrats by 1959. In the early years of the Eisenhower administration, Senate Democrats clearly had the opportunity to delay his appointments. They also had an incentive to do so. Yet they did not pursue a strategy of delay. Vacancy duration was shorter early in the Eisenhower administration, relative to later years, and the pace of appointments was greater over and above the "normal" increased pace experienced during the beginning of all new administrations.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution provides opportunity and incentive for the president and Senate to conflict over judicial appointments at all levels. The political science literature clearly documents that conflict is largely partisan when it comes to Supreme Court vacancies. Most of the literature has examined the roll call vote on confirmation as the primary forum for conflict. Goldman and Slotnick (1997) recently pointed out that in assessing the "success" of an administration's appointments, one must focus on more than the few or rare instances of nominees being defeated in an actual confirmation vote. Rather, the president's difficulties may best be assessed by criteria such as the extent of delay in confirmation processes or the failure to gain final votes on nominees. (p. 255) We have turned to this evidence and find that vacancy duration has been and is significantly related to a number of political factors, such as the size of the president's opposition in the Senate, whether the eventual appointee was a minority or a woman, and the timing of the vacancy with respect to presidential elections. As a result, the ability to keep the federal bench fully staffed and many fundamental characteristics of the federal bench are subject to a wide variety of political influences. After all, had the president and Senate been able to negotiate better over appointments in 1992, the vacancy crisis may not have been precipitated, and the kinds of judges sitting on the bench today would have been dramatically different.
Even though our data do not include vacancies arising during the most recent backlog "crisis" (many of which remain unfilled and therefore unavailable for analysis in our design), our empirical findings present an unambiguous explanation for much of the backlog:
Clinton's commitment to appoint minorities and women to the federal bench. After controlling for a variety of factors relating to vacancy delay, women and minorities take almost twice as long to confirm. This view is supported by a century-long analysis of vacancies but is even more evident in our final model, which is restricted to vacancies arising since 1947. The other prominent explanation for the current backlog, gridlock rooted in short-term partisan competition, is mostly rejected by our analysis.
Interestingly, although the bargaining process over appointments tends to be foreshortened during periods of remarkable legislativeexecutive unity, and the process tends to drag on in a rational fashion in anticipation of the next presidential election, the president's opponents in the Senate clearly do not fully exploit their opportunities to delay. Their "failure" to do so is especially evident when they have the greatest incentive to do so. Presidential appointees tend to be most partisan early in an administration, and partisan change of a judicial seat is most likely immediately after a change in partisan control of the White House, yet the Senate seems to acquiesce most at this time. This facet of legislative-executive negotiations over circuit court vacancies stands in stark contrast to previous empirical analyses of Supreme Court appointments and was not evident in previous analyses of Senate Judiciary Committee scrutiny of circuit courts appointments.
The reason for this apparently irrational behavior lies in the broader ebb and flow of U.S. presidential elections. The moment following a change in partisan control of the White House is the time when the president's partisan opponents in the Senate tend to be strongest, and their party's control over the judiciary tends to be the greatest. Yet, during those early days, there seems to be a presumption in favor of the president, such that vacancies are unusually short. In sum, appointment negotiations between the president and the Senate both anticipate and respond to electoral mandates. When examining legislativeexecutive negotiations over federal court appointments, we advise future researchers against adopting a simple short-term rational model of presidential-Senate conflict rooted in partisanship and suggest incorporating longer run dynamics rooted in electoral mandates and partisan reputation.
NOTES
1. An exception recently appeared in Kemper and Van Winkle's (1999) paper on lower court vacancy duration, which uses a statistical approach similar to ours and therefore includes multivariate controls.
2. Of course, White House transition difficulties, along with a myriad of idiosyncratic factors, may contaminate this particular measure by indicating delay that has nothing to do with presidential-Senate bargaining. We expect that most of these idiosyncrasies will be nonsystematic and therefore legitimately treated as "white noise." Transition difficulties probably are related to electoral cycles, but they cannot be observationally distinguished from bargaining difficulties. In addition, any transition difficulties should mute the "honeymoon" effect reported later, so our reported findings are, if anything, even stronger.
3. In this article, Senate recesses have not been subtracted from the time interval, which differs from the previous literature (Allison, 1996; Hartley & Holmes, 1997) . We believe Senate recesses are probably a part of the bargaining process, so they have been included. Nevertheless, we conducted all our analyses, subtracting Senate recesses from the dependent variable, with essentially identical statistical results.
4. As discussed in Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), Cox's model may provide misleading estimates when there are an inordinate number of observations with the same duration. In our data, 5.1% of vacancies were filled the next day. This proportion is only slightly larger than the 5% rule of thumb suggested by Yamaguchi (1991) as tolerable. We used the exact marginal likelihood approximation for tied cases, though the choice of approximation has no impact on the results for this small number of ties. We subsequently conducted all of the analyses using both Weibull and exponential models, which confirmed that the Cox estimates were not misleading. There were no differences in statistical inference for any variables between the models, so we report only the less restrictive model estimates here.
5. We excluded the first 9 transfers from the earlier appellate court circuits and the first 10 new appointments to the circuits. Each of these commissions occurred on the same day, the first day they were authorized, and the politics of confirmation were likely quite distinct from later appointments.
6. For new seats, we deemed the seat vacant beginning the date the president signed the relevant judgeship bill, unless the legislation specifically noted a date before which a seat could not be filled. For example, the 1984 judgeship bill, signed July 10, 1984, authorized 24 new appeals courts judgeships but specified that no more than 11 seats could be filled prior to January 21, 1985-1 day after the next presidential inauguration. In the case of replacement seats, we deemed the seat vacant beginning the date the preceding judge left office, regardless of whether the retirement had been announced earlier.
7. For recess appointments, the seat was deemed filled on the day the president signed the recess commission.
8. In the language of Box-Steffensmeier and Jones's (1997) review, this is a continuoustime model with time-invariant covariates and no censored observations, or the traditional Cox proportional hazard rate model. 9. Rather than having to deal with censored durations, data for the few seats vacated before December 1994 and filled afterwards were gathered from the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (Chase, 1998) , Web sites of the various U.S. circuit courts of appeals, and by a generous provision by the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary. Commission dates, again, were provided by the Federal Judicial Center.
10. For purposes of explanatory analysis, a more complicated operationalization, such as a set of dummy variables indicating which quarter of a presidential election cycle the vacancy arose, is possible. After all, the duration of vacancies may not uniformly increase over the course of the presidential election cycle. Preliminary analysis suggests that a positive step effect, based on the midterm election, is also a fair characterization of the pattern of vacancies across a presidential cycle, but it is not superior to our linear operationalization, based on a likelihood ratio (LR) test.
11. The main effect for second presidential term could be included but fails to make a significant contribution to the model, based on an LR test, and results in a coefficient contrary to expectations. As discussed later, this merely reinforces our overall results-that second presidential terms do not result in longer vacancies. We chose a more parsimonious specification that excludes the main effect.
12. FDR's third term and the beginning of his fourth term are coded as second terms, following Hagle's (1993) convention. Even though second terms were not constitutionally prohibited for much of the time frame of this study, a two-term limit established by Washington has been a very strong norm (Hagle, 1993) and probably structured the political calculations with respect to expiring nominations and vacancies.
13. The magnitude of the president's partisan opposition in the Senate at the time the vacancy began, expressed as a proportion of the chamber, could be substituted with essentially identical results. We have chosen the simpler measure of partisan conflict because both studies of circuit court vacancy delay relied on it (Allison, 1996; Hartley & Holmes, 1997) . In addition, we were unable to explore how the impact of the party of the appointee interacted with the divided government factor, due to limited number of cases. When the president nominates from the "other" party during divided government, nominees probably receive rapid confirmation. On the other hand, the president would be expected to delay such a nomination, countervailing the rapid confirmation. Of the seven vacancies filled in this manner, three took longer than average to fill, relative to contemporaneous vacancy durations.
14. This measure, the proportion of judges sitting on the U.S. circuit courts of appeals who share the president's party affiliation, was derived from data available in the Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski (1997) appellate biographical data set, in conjunction with the service dates gathered for this project. An example of the data, in time-series form, is presented in Figure 1 of Nixon and Haskin (2000) .
15. As mentioned in Note 13, the main effect for the magnitude of the president's partisan opposition in the Senate could be substituted for the unified government and filibuster dummies, with essentially identical results. The main effect for the magnitude of the president's partisan opposition on the bench could also be included but does not make a significant contribution to the model, based on an LR test. We chose the most parsimonious and institutionally grounded set of predictors in our specification.
16. It is possible that the characteristics of predecessors are the determining factor, as politicians struggle over replacing females with females and minorities with minorities. Aside from the fact that these characteristics turn out to be unrelated to vacancy duration, we find no evidence of the existence of "female seats" and only some evidence of "minority seats" on the federal bench. Of 17 females appointed to the bench, not a single one was a replacement for a female predecessor. Of the 18 minorities appointed to the bench, 3 were replacements for previously sitting minorities. All three instances involved African Americans replacing African Americans. Three apparent "minority" seats is more than would be expected by chance alone but is not an overwhelming number or proportion.
17. As heterogeneity across circuits may not be immediately obvious without controlling for other independent variables, we included a full range of circuit dummies and included them in our preliminary analyses, as might be done for panel data. Only the D.C. Circuit dummy was significant, and likelihood ratio tests indicated that all other circuit dummies should be dropped from the analysis. The table in the subsequent section therefore reports only the D.C. Circuit coefficient estimate.
18. Because of increased case filings and the increased use of judges with "senior status," case filings per sitting judge may not be a very good measure of workload across the entire 20th century. Marginal changes in workload in early years are completely swamped by the long-run variation, even when those marginal changes have more real consequences for vacancy duration. The Judicial Conference of the US (JCUS) implicitly recognizes this logic, as it reports the annual percentage increase in case filings as one of its benchmark workload indicators. The annual reports of the JCUS are our data sources for this measure.
19. Excluded for new seats. 20. Following Hartley and Holmes (1997) , "exceptionally well qualified," a category dropped by the ABA in 1988, was coded as "well qualified."
21. Subsequent checks confirmed that our results are not sensitive to the choice of whether to calculate traditional or robust standard errors.
22. Perhaps tellingly, three of those five were D.C. Circuit appointments, so senatorial courtesy was not an issue. They were all subsequently confirmed.
23. It is possible to distinguish between African Americans and Hispanics in the analysis, but the limited number of Hispanic appointments inflates the standard error for this estimate. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the estimated increased vacancy duration for African Americans is nearly identical in magnitude to the increased vacancy duration for Hispanics.
24. Both the Jones and Robinson assessments are presented in Goldman (1997, pp. 239-240) .
25. Because of the omnibus character of new seat legislation in recent decades, there is very little variation for many of our independent variables in this subset of the most recent 108 new seat vacancies. As a result, the effect of ABA ratings for new seat vacancies is difficult to empirically examine, and we are not prepared to defend a more finely parsed examination for this sample. Given that gender and racial effects are nonexistent for new seats overall, there may be no need to control for ABA ratings anyway.
26. Incidentally, neither female nor minority appointees have lower ABA ratings, as an empirical matter (t = 0.19 for women, t = 0.22 for minorities).
27. A likelihood ratio test confirms the joint significance of the effects (χ 2 = 6.8**). 28. The same assertions hold true for an alternative operationalization-an interaction term between the proportion of partisan bench opponents and a divided government dummy.
